upported by a rich cultural heritage, the Haitian people retain a capacity for hope, faith, and resilience that remains a tremendous resource for any efforts to rehabilitate the nation and its people.
S
upported by a rich cultural heritage, the Haitian people retain a capacity for hope, faith, and resilience that remains a tremendous resource for any efforts to rehabilitate the nation and its people.
précis Interviews Diane Davis D iane Davis, a member of CIS, is professor of political sociology in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning. Her current research is focused on cities in conflict and, within that area, police corruption and police violence.
Through a USAID grant, Davis and John Tirman (the Center's executive director and a principal research scientist) will explore how cities from Brazil to Pakistan cope with violence, and inform policymakers of promising practices. Much Ado About Decline by Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson F or at least the third time in the post-war era, the decline of American power is at the forefront of American foreign policy discourse. Underlying the decline debate is a consensus that decline, if and when it occurs, will be disastrous for American interests.
continued on page 12

Study on Women's Security
A year-long study in six countries has found that the goals of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, enacted 10 years ago, have not been fulfilled and that implementation is generally poor. 
DD:
The IDG, which is a program group within DUSP, exists in order to provide a sub-community within DUSP for students and faculty that work on developing countries. We work as a group to ensure that our students are offered the research and internship opportunities that will make them good international development planners. I saw myself as an enabler of these activities, a task consistent with my strong commitment to the interdisciplinary opportunities at CIS. For instance, I try to link our students in DUSP to the international discussion and debate on the developing world that occurs at CIS.
précis: CIS is a truly interdisciplinary research institute, as demonstrated in your self-description as a "political sociologist." What is the research orientation of political sociology as a field, as distinct from either political science or sociology more generally? DD: One general distinction is that sociologists do not work exclusively within the domain of the state, understanding instead that politics can occur in society as well. In my own writings, I look at both the state and society, focusing on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, or between citizens and states-I have written about social movements and political parties from this perspective. I also am an urbanist, and I look at movements and politics within the context of cities. So when I examine sociological phenomena like state formation and political party development, I am very interested in the role that the city and urban populations play in both local and national political trajectories. As a sociologist, I am engaged with questions that complement much of the work in political science, to be sure; but I use a slightly different approach. For example, many political scientists take the national state as point of departure, whereas I am interested in how states get formed in the first place, and my focus is as likely to be sub-national and transnational governance structures and processes, and how they may impact national-states. 
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M I T C e n T e r f o r I n T e r n a T I o n a l S T u d I e S Maybe we can do another interview a year from now after we have undertaken our field work, and I will have more to share about positive and negative adaptations. What I can say now is that as a general matter, it often is very hard to tell which is which. For instance, I have worked extensively on the development of private police, one adaptation to violence that is seen when citizens hire their own private security forces. This kind of adaptation can protect individuals from the ravages of chronic violence, not only from criminals, but also when violence accelerates because the "public" police are corrupt and untrustworthy. But when individuals hire their own armed security personnel, when these armed forces answer to no-one but their private clients, and when neither the security forces nor their private clients are fully accountable to public or democratic authorities, we might also see a vicious cycle where more people become armed and where violence becomes the currency of daily life. Private security may contribute to the social and physical separation of the rich from the poor, or limit mobility in space, or contribute to unequal access to basic goods and services, all of which can actually drive violence. So we don't yet know the long-term consequences of adaptations, even those which on the surface look like positive responses.
précis: How did you become interested in these broad questions of political sociology? What are the intellectual origins of your research agenda?
DD: My interest in urban violence began because of my longstanding research on Mexico City, a place I have studied for many years, but which in recent years has suffered from growing rates of violence. I first began studying Mexico City as a doctoral student, when I sought to integrate my interest in the political economy of development with the study of rapid urbanization. Over the years, I have focused on many different themes, ranging from the growth of Mexico City and how it laid the path for national political and economic development, to the emergence of urban social movements and their impact on democratization in Mexico, to the rise of leftist mayoral administrations and their role in revitalizing democracy and civil society. Each of these themes reinforced my deep engagement with and love for the history, culture, and politics of Mexico and its capital city. Starting in 1994, however, I started to see that Mexico City was confronting new problems of violence, and that these problems were threatening to undermine all the positive developments in politics, democracy, and civil society that had unfolded in prior years. Today, Mexico has chronic violence, organized crime, alternative imagined communities, an increasingly unstable political system, and a disenfranchised and distressed citizenry. These developments captured my imagination, driving me to the study or urban resilience in situations of chronic violence while also motivating me to ask "big questions" about state formation, governance, and the rule of law. 
DD:
That is really a hard question for me to answer. In the field of planning, policy prescription and implementation are important parts of professional practice. Still, in the field of planning (and maybe also in political science), I also know that there are two types of people: those who focus on identifying the character and context of pressing social problems, and those whose aim is to solve those problems. While both these tasks inform each other in the best of all worlds, and some of the most renowned planning professionals can do both, I definitely see myself as falling in the former category. I am a scholar by nature, and I am interested in studying the historical roots of problems and specifying their complexity. I think it is important to do this before jumping to policy prescriptions, partly because it is all too easy to fall into the trap of promoting a certain policy without knowing well enough whether that policy will address the particular challenge at hand. I like to call this a solution in search of a problemand there are lots of examples floating around the policy world today, whether in the form of micro-credit, social capital, decentralization, citizen participation, or what have you. These are policy prescriptions that have become so popular that scholars often try to apply them everywhere, whatever the issue is at hand. I spend a lot of time trying to convince my students that they need to understand the origins and dynamics of problems more deeply, and that every place facing such problems will have peculiarities specific to their local situation. My job is to give students the analytical tools to understand the complexity of the problem and the problem-solving environment, so that they can actually intervene effectively. Policy can become a repertoire of mantras oriented toward general actions that work in a large array of situations. My work lies on the other end of the spectrum, where every problem needs deep, contextspecific research. Where the two ends of the spectrum come together, lasting and significant policy innovations are made. n A year-long study in six countries has found that the goals of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, enacted 10 years ago, have not been fulfilled and that implementation is generally poor. The UN itself, major industrial powers, other international organizations, and conflict states have all failed to include women in peace processes and peacebuilding, two key goals of the resolution.
The study, "What the Women Say: Participation and UNSCR 1325," was organized by CIS and the International Civil Society Action Network, a NGO based in Washington DC. The 50-page study and recommendations were released on Oct. 28 at the U.S. Mission to the UN.
In the six countries-Aceh (Indonesia), Colombia, Israel and Palestine, Liberia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda-researchers found that the governments had essentially failed to take the necessary steps to raise women's participation. In some of these countries, formal legislation had been enacted but had not been implemented. In others, special advisers or commissions have been created, but the offices are ineffective, politicized, or diverting resources from women NGOs.
The study was based on extensive interviews in each country, government documents, press accounts, and the experience of the study team. The work was supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Irish Aid, Forum for Women and Development, Channel Foundation, among others.
The case studies were conducted by Cerue Garlo, Liberia; Shyamala Gomez, Sri Lanka; Suraiya Kamaruzzaman, Aceh; Turid Smith Polfus, Palestine/Israel; Elena Rey, Colombia; and Lina Zedriga, Uganda. (Biographies are available in the full report.) "The insights these women have brought to the 1325 discourse underscore two related points," said John Tirman, executive director of CIS. "The first is that the Member States are not fulfilling their obligations, which is a serious failing that should concern everyone who believes in the utility of collective security. The second is this is a resolution that is both realistic and innovative, covering half the population of the world. It is important, and it is being ignored." n The scale and nature of the recent devastation are unprecedented. Nonetheless, the physical and psychosocial aftershocks have created eerie parallels to events analyzed in this book-from accusations that Haitian culture and religious practices are responsible for this tragedy and hamper efforts to remedy it to the outpouring of concern for Haitian victims and the influx of aid to the nation. Other parallels that raise the uncanny specter of déjà vu are the lack of donor coordination, widespread frustration with the distribution of humanitarian resources, and the escalation of violence among the internally displaced.
Since the ouster of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, the Government of Haiti has had only limited capacity to protect its citizens and has struggled to establish security apparatuses that operate transparently and are accountable to Haitian citizens. While the abbreviated tenure of Haiti's first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, initially raised hopes of peace and security in the nation, his ouster by military coup in 1991 and three subsequent years of repression thwarted those aspirations. Since the political upheaval of 2004 following Aristide's second ouster from the presidency, thousands of UN military peacekeepers, international police, and international and local staffers have worked to arrest crime and promote security, much as was the case in the period following the restoration of democracy in 1994. Many of these individuals were killed during the earthquake, and others are still missing.
Although additional UN and U.S. military forces are currently attempting to restore order and provide humanitarian relief, security remains of paramount concern. The earthquake damaged the national penitentiary. Thousands of former prisoners are currently at large. Some of these escapees undoubtedly orchestrated the destabilization of democracy and security in Haiti in the 1990s and in 2004. Armed gang members who had been imprisoned have reportedly returned to slums they once ruled to reassert their sovereign power.
The struggles of the Government of Haiti to protect its citizens and assert its sovereignty are no better demonstrated than by the actions of an American missionary Democratic Insecurities:
Violence, Trauma, and Intervention in Haiti
Erica Caple James
Erica Caple James is associate professor of anthropology at MIT and member of CIS.
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M I T C e n T e r f o r I n T e r n a T I o n a l S T u d I e S précis group recently charged with child trafficking. The group claims it was rescuing children from the chaos of postquake conditions and was taking them to an orphanage in the Dominican Republic where they would be adopted. The group felt a divine call to intervene without authorization by the Haitian state in order to save the children, some of whom still have living parents. As the case has progressed, questions have arisen about the true intentions of this group, the corruption of the Haitian judiciary, and whether justice is for sale or will be meted out according to the rule of law. But the case is also an indicator of the extent to which international actors feel entitled to intervene in order to fulfill their mandates.
There are other parallels to the circumstances documented in this book. As during the 1991-1994 period, hundreds of thousands of Haitians have fled to provincial cities, towns, and villages seeking asylum in areas that once depended on their labor in the capital for subsistence. Many Haitians have crossed into the Dominican Republic seeking medical care and new lives. It remains unclear whether the population shift to rural Haiti will result in permanent resettlement and future development of the nation's periphery, as was intended by many of the international development plans that proposed the nation's decentralization in prior years. The United States has also begun to prepare its naval site in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to receive a potential influx of refugees should conditions worsen and desperation increase. The detention of Haitian "boat people" in this camp is not new. Long before it was used to house suspected terrorists, Camp Delta held tens of thousands of Haitians for reasons of humanitarian and security concerns during the 1991-94 coup years. The majority of these "inmates" were subsequently returned to Haiti, despite its ongoing political and economic crisis.
Also reminiscent of the conditions described here are reports that have begun to circulate regarding the rape of women and young girls. Haitian women of all classes have traditionally been the pillars of society. They bear greater responsibility for maintaining the household and family than do men, and many do so while also pursuing independent livelihoods to meet their families' needs. Such expectations must be fulfilled regardless of shifts in political, economic, or environmental conditions. Because of these disproportionate obligations, Haitian women have typically been less mobile and more strongly rooted in their communities. For precisely these same reasons, they have also been more susceptible to attacks: it is difficult to flee from persecution when one's livelihood, family, and home are tied to a particular neighborhood, market, or place of work. If current reports are accurate, the makeshift tent cities that currently provide refuge to the internally displaced are sites of further victimization of women rather than sites of asylum, which raises additional questions regarding how security will be established in Haiti. Such conditions also highlight how gender is an integral component of the experience of insecurity and trauma.
continued on next page
The excerpt from Democratic Insecurities was reprinted with permission from University of California Press.
précis
Other similarities between the current crisis and the conflict and postconflict period in the 1990s concern the politics of aid. A few recent reports suggest that criminal actors have begun to capitalize on the chaos in order to expand their traffic in persons, drugs, and illicit goods. This book characterizes black market transactions like these as components of occult economies, some of which incorporate hidden exchanges between material and unseen (or immaterial) worlds. Furthermore, scandalous stories have circulated about how humanitarian aid has been diverted from its intended recipients into the black market. Well-intentioned charities have been questioned about the authenticity and legitimacy of their work in Haiti. There have been signs of contention between and among grassroots and international nongovernmental organizations regarding how and to which institutions the hundreds of millions of dollars in charitable gifts that have been donated to aid Haiti will be distributed. These ethical debates involving the just distribution of resources to victims and to the organizations that assist them are described here as components of a political economy of trauma.
As these events continue to unfold, there will come a point at which the numerous agencies and agents now working to provide relief will shift from a framework of emergency to one of reconstruction and rehabilitation. This book analyzes how such transitions occur. It is a cautionary tale documenting how conditions of insecurity have evolved over time. The phenomenon of insecurity incorporates political and criminal violence, economic instability, environmental vulnerability, and long histories of corruption and predation on the part of Haitians and foreign interveners. This text also chronicles how the transition from a crisis mode of intervention to one aimed at sustainable development of Haitian institutions-the police, the judiciary, and civil society organizations that promote democracy, human rights, and rehabilitation and reparations for victims-provoked competition and strife within the governmental and nongovernmental aid apparatus in the context of insecurity. To some extent the influx of aid had the unintended consequence of exacerbating the conditions that gave rise to military and humanitarian interventions in Haiti in the first place.
Some people have characterized the earthquake tragedy as an opportunity for Haiti's transformation, as long as Haitians remain partners in deciding how plans for their country's redevelopment and reconstruction are to take place. Calls for partnership and greater economic employment opportunities for Haitians are important and necessary. What remains crucial is that Haitians from all social classes and geographic locations participate in such plans. Regardless of the material or infrastructural disparities in power between Haiti and other members of the international community, Haitians must be imbued with equal (if not greater) power than international, national, and local interveners in deciding the course of reconstruction efforts in their country.
As this book demonstrates, it is perilous to consider Haiti and its citizens solely as clients, recipients of welfare or charity, or as victims. This lesson is even more urgent given that there are several populations affected by the earthquake whose status is similar to that of Haiti's victims of human rights abuses following the 1994 restoration of democracy. As was the case then, the Government of Haiti possesses little capacity to provide security, civil services, and medical care for its citizens. Women are increasingly vulnerable to insecurity. The number of orphans has increased exponentially. Thousands of new amputees of all ages require multiple forms of rehabilitation to help them rebuild their lives. If these populations are singled out for greater psychological, physical, economic, and other social supports because they are considered "at risk," but similar opportunities are not made available for all Haitians to flourish as productive citizens, it is possible that these groups may become subject to further stigma and resentment in their communities, as were victims of human rights abuses from the coup and postcoup years.
These issues of population management, the regulation and distribution of resources,
"Regardless of the material or infrastructural disparities in power between Haiti and other members of the international community, Haitians must be imbued with equal (if not greater) power than international, national, and local interveners in deciding the course of reconstruction efforts in their country."
Democratic Insecurities continued from previous page identity, and accountability are important considerations for Haitians in Haiti and its diaspora and for those who would aid in rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. However, such concerns should not overshadow attention to the physical, psychosocial, and spiritual effects of trauma that are the primary focus of this book. Trauma can result from ruptures in the routines of daily life, whether caused by natural, industrial, or human authors. Those who survive such ruptures may experience acute trauma; providers of care to victims may experience secondary trauma during and after a crisis. Trauma and emotional distress are phenomena that are culturally mediated and experienced in bodily ways. Whereas some view the devastation caused by the earthquake as an opportunity to create a blank slate in Haiti, the stories recounted in this book suggest that without effective strategies to address these traumas the power of memory and the embodied legacies of acute victimization will render attempts to mitigate suffering and to promote reconstruction and development ineffective.
Other questions addressed in this book must now be considered anew. How long will the "emergency" funds flow? How and to whom are private donations accounted for? Will the rehabilitation of trauma (whether physical, psychological, infrastructural, or spiritual) be rationed, regulated, and curtailed prematurely, so as to have only limited effect? What identities will emerge for these new "victims" after Haiti's dependence on charity, emergency relief, and other forms of humanitarian and development aid reemerges as a large component of its current economy? If new paths toward sustainable development cannot be created to empower all Haitians and to restore those who wish to rebuild their broken communities, aid interventions risk exacerbating the cycles of insecurity that have ebbed and flowed over the past twenty-five years.
Supported by a rich cultural heritage, the Haitian people retain a capacity for hope, faith, and resilience that remains a tremendous resource for any efforts to rehabilitate the nation and its people. Even when a powerful minority-whether Haitian or foreign-has posed obstacles to democracy, human rights, justice, and economic possibilities for all, the majority has endured. They must participate as equal partners in the reconstruction of their nation.n Joint Research on Regulatory Science CIS, along with The European Medicines Agency (EMA) and MIT's Center for Biomedical Innovation (CBI), is launching a collaborative research project with a focus on enhancing regulatory science in pharmaceuticals.
Specific questions addressed by this project include how to adapt current regulatory requirements to best support the efficient development of safe and effective drugs; how to incorporate patient valuation of health outcomes and benefit-risk preferences into regulatory decisionmaking; how to implement what have been termed staggered and progressive approaches to drug approval; and how to improve fulfilment of postmarketing regulatory requirements.
The data and recommendations from this project are expected to link to implementation of the "EMA roadmap to 2015" and the overall CBI's New Drug Development Paradigms (NEWDIGS) Research Program. It will explore the feasibility, priorities, and practical considerations of implementing demonstration project(s) on some of the issues addressed during the course of the research.
The project, scheduled to be completed by December 2011, will be conducted within the framework of CBI's NEWDIGS research program in cooperation with CIS and EMA. "China is not waiting to revamp its economy. Germany is not waiting. India is not waiting. These nations-they're not standing still. Underlying the decline debate is a consensus that decline, if and when it occurs, will be disastrous for American interests. Analysts depict interrelated problems. Some warn decline will undermine the credibility of American commitments. Others argue alliances will form to counterbalance the U.S. In extremis, some contend, a declining U.S. will be forced to go to war against revisionist rising powers eager to remake the U.S.-dominated international system. In short, decline is seen to portend a widening period of danger for the United States as other states adjust their policies to take advantage of impending U.S. weakness. 2 But this picture of disaster is incomplete. Historically, Britain's relative loss of power before World War I encouraged rivals such as the United States, France, and Japan to settle outstanding political differences with Britain. Likewise, the perceived decline of the United States in the 1970s saw NATO allies increase their military contributions to European security. In short, history suggests striking variation in the consequences of decline as some relatively rising states challenge the interests of declining actors, whereas other rising states support them.
Under what conditions should we expect supportive policies rather than exploitative ones? Scholars and policymakers presently lack an answer as most existing studies on decline focus on the tendency of decline to lead to war between rising and declining states. Though historically insightful, this literature is less than helpful in an era where war between great powers is unlikely due to the presence of nuclear weapons, extensive economic interdependence, and large geographic barriers between rising and declining states.
Conceptualizing Decline's Consequences
Analysts typically look to three factors-the economic, military, and diplomatic policies of other states-when describing the potential challenges of decline. These factors comprise what I term a state's balancing response towards a declining state. Balancing responses matter because they can 1) force a declining state to expend greater resources to sustain its interests or accept their loss, or 2) help reduce the declining state's costs. In this sense, balancing responses fall on a scale ranging from "extremely exploitative" to "extremely supportive." Unsurprisingly, the more a state tries to force a declining state to surrender or pay a higher price for its interests, the more exploitative the response. On the other hand, the more a great power reduces armaments, avoids interfering in a declining great power's sphere of influence, or offers the declining state economic assistance, the greater the degree of support. 
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Military Threat and Balancing Responses
The key to international balancing responses is the credibility of a declining state's military threat. Threat credibility results from the size, composition, and posture of the armed forces of the declining state relative to its opponents. Exploitation occurs when a state believes the declining adversary's military stands a reasonable chance of imposing unacceptable costs on a state's own interests. The logic is simple: efforts to further degrade a declining state's capabilities provide an opportunity to remove the threat entirely. A similar logic applies to support: at some point a declining adversary's military cannot be expected to pose a substantial risk. Under these conditions, a state will grow concerned that continued exploitation will generate significant "blowback": third parties may view exploitation as aggression, while the declining adversary may be incentivized to drive itself hard, put its house in order, and renew its challenge. Supportive responses forestall this possibility.
The Collapse of the Soviet Order and the Consequences of Decline
The U.S. response to the collapse of the Soviet Union offers preliminary support for this argument. It is also a critical test for a more general assessment of decline's consequences: as long-standing adversaries, one intuitively expects the U.S. to do everything in its reach to exploit Soviet decline and ensure its demise as a great power. Indeed, the Reagan Administration's policy after 1982 was specifically designed to isolate the Soviet Union politically, exacerbate its economic problems at home, blunt its perceived military edge, and ultimately "encourage the dissolution of the Soviet Empire." 3 By the close of 1988, this strategy yielded results-Soviet decline was increasingly apparent. The Soviet economy was in trouble as economic growth stagnated. 4 The Soviet military, facing stagnant budgets since the late 1970s and budget cuts after 1988, confronted stark resource tradeoffs driven by qualitative improvements to Western military forces. 5 Soviet politics were also increasingly in turmoil as Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, faced strong opposition from conservatives within the Party over his policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). 6 American policymakers, who recognized mounting Soviet economic problems as early as 1981, began to discuss the possibility of a major change in the distribution of power. 7 U.S. policy, however, reacted slowly to these changes. Through the middle of 1989, the Bush Administration resisted pressure to reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe, only moving to study the issue. 8 It backed away from arms control negotiations begun by the preceding Reagan Administration, and promised economic assistance to Soviet client states in Eastern Europe if they reformed their economic and political systemsthat is, if they removed themselves from the Soviet orbit. 9 Overall, U.S. policy through the first half of 1989 was moderately exploitative: if not imposing new costs on the Soviet Union, then also doing nothing to lessen the costs of Cold War competition.
Soviet power then experienced a precipitous drop in the second half of 1989 as Soviet client regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed. 10 Unilateral Soviet force withdrawals, announced in December 1988, also began to shift the military balance away from the USSR.
11 By the start of 1990, the Soviet position in Central Europe was crumbling as newly established democratic regimes looked to evict Soviet forces from their territory while seeking economic aid from the West. 12 Counter-intuitively, however, this was precisely when U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union began to change. Force reductions were codified as U.S. policy, and Bush proposed deeper force reductions in his 1990 State of the Union address than previously considered possible. 13 Even more dramatically, the United States-elaborating on a West German proposal-offered Gorbachev a comprehensive set of guarantees regarding Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe. These included pledges that would limit NATO's presence in the former Communist countries; limits on the size and composition of the German military; pledges to reform NATO and transform it into a more "political" alliance; and hints of economic assisMuch Ado About Decline continued from previous page précis tance.
14 There is also significant evidence that U.S. officials promised NATO would not expand eastward to encompass the former Communist regimes. While U.S. policy should not be overstated-for instance, the U.S. refused to provide the Soviet Union with economic assistance despite repeated calls for aid through this period-U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union nevertheless took on a different form following the collapse of East European communism.
The collapse of the Soviet position became a rout over the second half of 1990 and 1991. Soviet forces began to withdraw from Eastern Europe, while the Soviet economy experienced sharp contractions. Meanwhile, domestic turmoil increasingly undermined the Soviet political system itself: not only did the conflicts between Soviet reformers and conservatives sharpen as the Soviets retrenched from Eastern Europe, but a resurgence of nationalism undermined Moscow's control over individual Soviet republics. 15 Again, however, U.S. policy continued its moderate course. Several supportive measures-notably the signing of the START and CFE treaties-were pursued during this period. 16 Reversing earlier policy, the U.S. announced a limited aid package for the USSR and, after repeated Soviet efforts, encouraged USSR membership in international economic organizations. 17 Most interestingly, President Bush resisted strong domestic and international pressure to recognize the independence of individual Soviet republics-an act that would effectively undermine the political legitimacy of the Soviet Union itself-through the actual dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. 18 At the nadir of Soviet power and capabilities, the United States selected policies that effectively reduced pressure on their former adversary.
The central puzzle to explain in this case is the sudden shift in U.S. policy from exploitation to support in late-1989, and the acceleration of U.S. support as Soviet decline became a collapse. How does my theory fare in explaining these developments? The evidence is incomplete, but offers preliminary support for the core prediction that only when the Soviet military threat faded would the United States begin to support the Soviet Union. Indeed, this prediction tracks with the timing of the case: as described above, the major shift in U.S. policy did not occur until after the Soviet military threat to Western Europe receded during the second half of 1990. 19 Despite encroaching economic weakness throughout the 1980s and shifts in the political order in the second half of 1989, it was only when the Soviet military position became untenable that U.S. policy changed.
Another telling piece of evidence comes from the concerns voiced by U.S. policymakers about the future of the Soviet threat to Europe and the role this played in American policy. Bush Administration officials remained fundamentally worried throughout 1989-1991 that Soviet decline would prove ephemeral. Even as the Communist regimes in the Warsaw Pact collapsed and the Soviet military began withdrawing from the region, U.S. leaders grew concerned that the Soviet Union would eventually re-emerge as a military threat to Europe. 20 Prior to mid-1990, these concerns were used to justify efforts to accelerate Soviet withdrawal from Europe. By 1991, however, the concern was that only if the U.S. failed to support the USSR would this situation come to pass. The new concern was that continued U.S. exploitation would lead to a conservative coup in the USSR and Gorbachev's replacement with a hardliner seeking to undo the events of 1989-1990. 21 As one might expect if states care about the potential harm posed by declining powers, having eliminated the Soviet threat to Europe, policymakers were now eager to adopt policies that would help the USSR reconcile itself to a diminished place in Europe and limit the possibility of a renewed challenge.
Conclusion
More research is needed to flesh out the nascent theory described above. If accurate, however, then it holds important implications for the U.S. decline debate. précis cantly, it suggests that the United States need not be so pessimistic about the consequences of decline: as the Soviet case demonstrates, there is a limit on how far other states will go to exploit a declining adversary. This is not altruism, but a sincere concern that overly exploiting a declining adversary will generate more problems than it solves. Even declining states hold significant resources that can be used to make international politics unpleasant.
Equally important, the theory and case suggest that the U.S. may have a significant degree of agency in determining whether it is supported or exploited as decline progresses. Just as U.S. policy towards the declining USSR shifted as the USSR came to pose less of a threat to U.S. interests, by implication, the U.S. may be able to encourage other actors to support U.S. interests by reducing the size and presence of its military overseas. Ironically, avoiding exploitative outcomes as the U.S. declines will depend on an American willingness to adopt a more relaxed view towards its own decline.n R abia Mehmood, a journalist in the Lahore bureau of Express 24/7 Television in Pakistan, has received the 2010-11 Elizabeth Neuffer Fellowship. Mehmood is the sixth recipient of the annual fellowship, which gives a woman journalist working in print, broadcast or online media the opportunity to focus exclusively on human rights journalism and social justice issues. The award is offered through the International Women's Media Foundation and is sponsored in part by CIS. 
Seminar XXI Celebrates 25th Anniversary
Seminar XXI is the Center's educational program for senior military officers, government and NGO officials, and executives in the national security policy community. The program's objective is to provide future leaders of that community with enhanced analytic skills for understanding foreign countries and the relations among them. Seminar XXI began in 1986 as an experimental program adapted from several graduate-level courses taught at MIT. Over the years it has provided an opportunity for frank and challenging exchanges of ideas between policymakers and university scholars, as well as among the fellows, who themselves represent a wide range of institutions and organizations in the policymaking community. Seminar XXI is now in its twenty-fifth year and has more than 1,600 graduates. 
Report Card on President Obama
PEGS Initiates New Fellows Program
The Center's Program on Environmental Governance and Sustainability (PEGS) is initiating a new fellows program for graduate students at MIT. The award period runs from November 2010 through November 2011. This year's theme is "Environmental Change and Conflict" and the faculty directors for the 2010-2011 fellows are Diane Davis and PEGS director JoAnn Carmin, both from the Department of Urban Studies and Planning. The students will be working across the globe on issues related to environmental change and conflict. More details on the fellows and their projects can be found at http://web.mit.edu/cis/pegs.html.
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